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Reform of Japanese Telecommunications
Law: Panacea or Placebo?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Japanese government controlled the country's telecommunica-
tions system from 1869, when the Ministry of Technology inaugurated
telegraph service between Tokyo and Yokohama, until quite recently.1
The government's monopoly, operated since 1952 by the Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Public Corporation ("NTT"), ended on April 1,
1985, when Japan's new telecommunications laws became effective.2 The
new laws-the Telecommunications Business Law3 and the Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Corporation Act4 -open the Japanese telecommu-
nications market to private enterprise and transform NTT into a private
company.
I Ohashi, The Effects of Telecommunications Deregulation, 1982-83 HARV. U. PROGRAM ON
U.S.-JAPAN REL.: ANN. REv. 85, 90. See also Ito, Recent Trends in Telecommunications Regulation
and Markets in Japan, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 70, 72 (1984). The Ministry of Technology started the
telegraph service as a business run by the government. Id. at 72. The Ministry of Communications,
formed in 1885 to take over the telegraph business and the mails, began the Japanese public tele-
phone system as a government monopoly in 1890. Id. In 1949, the government split the Ministry of
Communications into the Ministry of Postal Services-to handle mail services-and the Ministry of
Telecommunications-to operate Japan's public telegraph and telephone systems until 1952. Id. at
73. For a detailed overview of the development of Japanese telecommunications prior to 1952, see J.
HILLS, DEREGULATING TELECOMS: COMPETITION AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES, JA-
PAN AND BRITAIN 102-03 (1986).
2 The Diet passed the new laws on December 20, 1984. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, No.
352, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN 365, 369 (1985) [hereinafter DOING Busi-
NESS WITH JAPAN].
3 Denki tsffshin jigydh5 (Telecommunications Business Law), Law No. 86, 1984 (translated in
JAPAN L. LETTER, Feb. 1985, at 19-30, and Mar. 1985, at 13-23)[hereinafter TBL].
4 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Act, Law No. -, 1984 [hereinafter NIT Act].
A third law, the Omnibus Act, concerning transitional provisions and enforcement of the two pri-
mary laws, also took effect on April 1, 1985. Its provisions fall outside the scope of this Comment.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:145(1987)
Japan's move toward a private telecommunications market is signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, the new laws opened up attractive business
opportunities for private companies because of the expected growth of
Japan's telecommunications market. Japan boasts the world's second
largest telecommunications system and market.5 For example, in 1983,
NTT accommodated nearly 42.5 million telephone service subscriptions.6
In fiscal 1984, NTT collected revenues of $19 billion, making it twice the
size of British Telecom, but only half as large as AT&T.7 NTT's own
telecommunications equipment purchases accounted for 46% of Japan's
$4.3 billion telecommunications equipment market in the same period.8
Furthermore, Japan's market will continue to grow. The Keidanren, the
Federation of Economic Organizations, estimates that this market could
reach $20 billion per annum by 1988.9 In fact, Japan's interconnect mar-
ket"° may increase by 30% annually.1 ' The new laws, therefore, have
opened a lucrative market to private enterprise.
The second benefit of Japan's new telecommunications laws is that
they may help reduce the growing telecommunications trade imbalance
between Japan and the United States,12 and thereby ease trade tensions
5 The United States has the largest telecommunications system and market. Nippon Telephone
& Telegraph Procurement Agreement" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Con-
sumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
27 (1984)(statement by Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of
Commerce)[hereinafter NTTProcurement Hearing]; JAPANESE EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION,
MINI-REPORT No. 4, YOUR MARKET IN JAPAN: COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 3 (Sept.
1984) [hereinafter JETRO].
6 Nippon, A CHARTERED SURVEY OF JAPAN 266 (I. Yano ed. 1985).
7 Japanese Telecoms, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 80.
8 Id. at 81. Purchases by private companies for in-house networks represented another 9% of
Japan's 1984 telecommunications equipment market; the remaining 45% represented the intercon-
nect market. Id. For a description of the interconnect market, see infra note 10.
9 Foster, Building New Barriers? The Draft Telecommunications Act, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP.,
Nov. 1984, at 9. The Telecommunications Advisory Council ("TAC"), an advisory body to the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications ("Ministry"), expects Japan's telecommunications mar-
ket to expand to I 10.4 trillion by 1990 and to - 19.4 trillion by 2000. Sawada, Japan Brings About
Fundamental Changes to the Communications System, Bus. JAPAN, May 1985, at 85, 88.
10 The interconnect market designates retail sales of consumer provided equipment ("CPE"),
such as telephones, facsimiles, private branch exchanges ("PBXs"), and telex terminals. See Note,
The Development of Japanese Telecommunications Policy and Its Impact on United States Trade: The
Movement Toward Market Liberalization, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 95, 116 n.140
(1985)[hereinafter Note, Japanese Telecommunications].
S1I Foster, supra note 9, at 9.
12 The degree to which United States sales in the Japanese telecommunications market will affect
the telecommunications trade imbalance will depend on the growth rate of Japan's telecommunica-
tions imports, not the market share held by United States companies. Telecommunications products
made in the United States already accounted for 90% of Japan's telecommunications imports in




between the two countries. United States trade officials and Congress
believe that the growing trade imbalance in telecommunications equip-
ment between Japan and the United States13 contributes significantly to
the overall trade imbalance between the two countries. 4 They have fo-
cused on Japan's efforts to open its telecommunications market as a sym-
bol of Japan's commitment to remedy the trade imbalance.15
This Comment outlines the development of Japanese telecommuni-
cations law as it shifted the market from a government monopoly to pri-
vate enterprise. This Comment first describes Japan's former policy goals
for telecommunications and the effects of its older telecommunications
laws.6 Next, this Comment describes Japan's new telecommunications
laws and the policy interests that shaped them.17 This Comment also
analyzes whether the impact of the new laws actually furthers their in-
tended policy objectives."8 The Comment concludes that Japan's new
telecommunications laws do promote several of Japan's current policy
13 Japan's telecommunications equipment trade surplus with the United States increased every
year between 1981 and 1984-it stood at Y67.6 billion in 1981, then increased to Y92.3 billion in
1982, Y 157.6 billion in 1983, and -295 billion in 1984. Davis, Implementation of MOSS Accord
Gives Foreign Firms a Better Chance, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 22, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
14 In 1975, Japan's trade surplus with the United States totaled only $1.86 billion. Note, Japa-
nese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 97 n.15. By 1986, that figure had grown to $58.6 billion.
1986 Deficit Hits Record $153 Billion Even Though December Figures Show Improvement, 4 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 125 (1987).
15 See Oversight on Government Procurement Code and Related Agreements: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7 (state-
ment by Senator Danforth)[hereinafter Procurement Code Hearing). Commerce Under Secretary
Lionel H. Olmer has characterized Japan's continuing reluctance to open its telecommunications
market to foreign competition and products as the watershed issue in trade relations between Japan
and the United States. Collision Course: Can the US. Avert a Trade War with Japan?, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 8, 1985, at 51. Indeed, when Congress initially perceived that Japan's new laws left intact trade
barriers to Japan's telecommunications market, three senators introduced protectionist trade bills in
retaliation against Japan. See S. 728, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985)(Senator Chaffee's bill to ban im-
ports of Japanese telecommunications equipment pending equal access to Japan's market); S. 770,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)(Senator Heinz's bill to impose a 20% across the board tariff on all
Japanese imports); S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)(Senator Danforth's bill to require reciprocity
in market access). In response to Congress' retaliatory trade bills, the chief editor of the Japan
Economic Review complained that Members of Congress use Japan as a scapegoat for the United
States trade deficit. Usami, Hysterical Congressional Attacks on Japan Bringing Much Harm to Ja-
pan-US. Friendship, Mutual Trust, JAPAN ECON. REV., May 15, 1985, at 2, col. 1. The editor noted
that 29.8% of the 1984 United States trade deficit was attributable to Japan. Id.
Congressional concern and reaction stemmed from the disparity between the United States
trade deficit with Japan and its deficit with other major trading partners. In 1984, the trade deficit
with Japan reached $37 billion, up from $19.6 billion in 1983, while trade deficits with Canada and
Europe totaled only $20 billion and $17 billion respectively. Mansfield, The U.S.-Japan Relation-
ship, J. AM. CHAMBER COM. JAPAN, June 1985, at 73.
16 See infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 62-199 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 200-70 and accompanying text.
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objectives, but represent only part of a long-term remedy for correcting
the telecommunications trade imbalance between Japan and the United
States.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTS OF JAPANESE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
The new Japanese telecommunications laws mark the most recent
step in Japan's development from a government controlled telecommuni-
cations system to a private one. Japan's former telecommunications laws
prescribed strict government control. For example, the Diet enacted the
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation Law ("PCL")' 9 in
1952 to create NTT, a government-owned corporation with a monopoly
over domestic telecommunications.20
By 1981, Japan had introduced foreign competition into its telecom-
munications system. On December 19, 1980, Japan and the United
States entered into a three-year telecommunications trade agreement
("Procurement Agreement") 21 and simultaneously issued a joint state-
ment ("Interconnect Agreement"). Under the Procurement Agreement,
NTT permitted foreign suppliers, for the first time, to bid on NTT pro-
curement contracts. Although it left unaffected the NTT monopoly, the
Procurement Agreement required NTT to accept bids from and to award
contracts to foreign suppliers on a competitive basis with Japanese sup-
pliers.22 At the same time, the Interconnect Agreement eased regulatory
restrictions on Japan's interconnect market.
The most recent step toward creating a competitive telecommunica-
tions market occurred on December 20, 1984, when the Diet passed Ja-
pan's new telecommunications laws. Under the new laws, the Japanese
government retained regulatory control over the telecommunications sys-
19 Nippon denshin denwa kdshahd (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation Law),
Law No. 250, 1952 [hereinafter PCL].
20 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 366; M. FOSTER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR JAPAN 3 (Oct. 1984)[hereinafter
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS]. The Japanese government frequently establishes public cor-
porations to run national enterprises. Shinto, Reform of the Telecommunications System in Japan,
31 JAPAN Q. 380 (1984). Japan entrusted international telecommunications to a monopoly called
Kokusai Telegraph and Telephone Company, Ltd. ("KDD"). Kokusai denshin denwa kabushiki
kaishahd (Kokusai Telegraph and Telephone Company, Ltd. Law), Law No. 301, 1952 [hereinafter
KDD Law]. KDD operated strictly international lines which interconnected with NTT's domestic
network. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND INFORMATION ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF COM., TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES IN SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES: PROSPECTS
FOR FUTURE COMPETITIVE ACCESS 137 (1983)[hereinafter SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES].
21 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, Dec. 19, 1980, United States-Japan 32
U.S.T. 4495, T.I.A.S. 9961 [hereinafter Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement].
22 See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
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tern. The laws ended NTT's monopoly, however, so that private domes-
tic and foreign companies now have competitive access to Japan's
telecommunications equipment and services markets.23
A. The Monopoly Era: Policy Objectives, the Law, and its Effects
The Diet had several policy objectives when it created NTT. The
primary objective was to establish nationwide telephone service24 because
it promoted the public welfare.25 The Diet reasoned that a government
monopoly, rather than a series of private telecommunications companies,
better ensured that telecommunications service would reach the most re-
mote parts of Japan.2 6 Moreover, a monopoly would be better able to
charge uniformly low local rates.27 Since constructing a telecommunica-
tions network required a large initial capital investment, the Diet pre-
sumed that the lack of competition would protect the large capital
investment better than a competitive market.28 A government monopoly
presumably assured efficiency by providing economies of scale,29 prevent-
ing duplicative investment,30 and developing uniform equipment and
transmitting standards.31 Finally, the government desired to cultivate
domestic industry.32
The government implemented these objectives through the PCL and
the Public Telecommunications Law of 1953 (the "1953 Law").33 Under
23 See infra notoes 159-99 and accompanying text.
24 Varner, Telecommunications Enters a New Age, J. AM. CHAMBER COM. JAPAN, Mar. 1985, at
31. World War II destroyed Japan's telephone system. In March 1951, the number of telephones
installed in Osaka only added up to 59% of the number of installed telephones in Osaka in 1940.
Japan's Transportation and Communications, 14 FAR E. ECON. REv. 238, 239 (1953). Among Ja-
pan's major cities that suffered war damage, only Fukuoka had rebuilt to its prewar standing by
March 1951, operating at 104% of its 1940 capacity. Id. Consequently, Japan wanted to restore and
develop its telephone system.
25 PCL art. 1.
26 See Shinto, supra note 20, at 380. Private companies would have concentrated their telecom-
munications networks in the most populated areas which generate the most business.
27 The Diet evidenced this policy concern by enacting legislation that kept local rates at Y7 per
telephone call from 1952 to 1972. J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 105. The telecommunications monop-
oly could meet the governmental restrictions on local rates by cross-subsidizing revenues from oper-
ations all across the country. In contrast, smaller private carriers, especially those serving low-
volume, rural areas, would be less suited to cross-subsidize revenues.
28 Japan Approves Competition in Telecommunications, Transnat'l Data Rep., Mar. 1985, at 53.
29 Shinto, supra note 20, at 380.
30 Burgess, Japan's Telephone Divestiture is Enticing American Suppliers, Washington Post, Dec.
3, 1984, at 21, col. 2.
31 Shinto, supra note 20, at 380.
32 Komiya & Renaud, Japanese Telecommunications Industry Privatization, Transnat'l Data
Rep., Apr.-May 1985, at 163.
33 K6shu denki tsnishinh6 (Public Telecommunications Law), Law No. 97, 1953 [hereinafter
1953 Law].
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the PCL, the Diet created NTT34 and provided for exclusive government
financing." The PCL allowed only NTT to engage in the business of
public telecommunications service and other business necessary to
achieve NTT's purposes.36 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions (the "Ministry"), the Cabinet, and ultimately the Diet had to ap-
prove NTT's annual budget and business plan.37 Finally, to encourage
growth among domestic equipment manufacturers, the PCL prohibited
NTT from purchasing telecommunications equipment from foreign com-
panies 38 and from manufacturing equipment on its own.
39
Under the 1953 Law, the Diet expanded NTT control to include the
telecommunications equipment market. For example, regulations re-
quired consumers to purchase from NTT their first telephone for each
telephone line.' After purchasing the "standard telephone set" from
NTT, the consumer could purchase and install retail equipment called
customer provided equipment ("CPE").4 Furthermore, the Ministry
delegated sole authority to NTT to set technical standards and to con-
duct testing and certification of both CPE and equipment purchased by
NTT for its own use or for leasing or resale.42 NTT also adopted instal-
lation standards. The 1953 Law even required NTT to inspect and ap-
prove the phone jack connection before NTT turned on the telephone
34 PCL art. 1.
35 .d. art. 5.
36 Id. art. 3(1). NTT had to receive approval from the Ministry before it could invest in any
business closely related to public telecommunications. Id. art. 41(7), 75. The PCL conditioned
NTT's tangential ventures on the Ministry's consent so as to protect companies in closely related
businesses from NTT competition. The Ministry limited NTT's tangential business to automobile,
ship, aircraft, and airport telephone service, pocket pager service, and technological research. Do-
ING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 380.
37 PCL art. 41. The government retained plenary control over personnel. The NTT board of
directors consisted of seven members: five directors plus NTT's president and vice president. Id. art.
11(I). The cabinet, with the consent of both houses of the Diet, appointed and could remove board
members. Id. art. 12(1), 15. The cabinet, moreover, with the consent of the board, appointed and
could remove the president and vice president. Id. art. 21(l), 24(1). Furthermore, management had
no control over employee compensation which was fixed at levels commensurate with other "na-
tional public service personnel," such as employees of Japan National Railways. Id. art. 30(2); H.
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 806 (1976).
In contrast, the government retained much less control over KDD. Like NTT, KDD could
conduct business incidental to its primary international service only after obtaining the Ministry's
consent. PCL art. 2. The Ministry, not the cabinet or the Diet, had appointment and removal
power over KDD directors. The Ministry also had final authority regarding amendments to KDD's
charter, disposal of profits, liquidation, and KDD's annual business plan. Id. art. 4.
38 See SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 157.
39 Id. at 151.
40 JETRO, supra note 5, at 3. In March 1985, a new telephone line plus the standard telephone
set cost about $310. Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7, at 80.
41 SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 154.





By revising the 1953 Law in 1971 and again in 1982, the Diet
opened data communication and value added network ("VAN")' serv-
ices to the private market. The 1971 revision permitted private compa-
nies to connect computers to NTT circuits in order to provide in-house
data communication services.4" Before the revision, only NTT could of-
fer domestic data communication services. 4 6 By October 1982, the Diet
permitted private companies to offer commercial VAN services over pub-
lic telecommunications lines.47 Previously, the 1953 Law disallowed pri-
vate companies to lease public telecommunications lines from NIT for
transmitting VAN services sold to the public.4 8
The PCL and the 1953 Law successfully implemented several of the
Diet's objectives. In March 1978, NTT completed a nationwide telecom-
munications system, thereby eliminating the backlog of telephone service
orders.49 In March 1979, the NTT system offered direct dialing service
43 1953 Law, art. 105(3)(4).
4 4 VANs transmit data from one computer to another via telephone lines. They enhance the
value of existing telephone lines by encoding and decoding signals so that incompatible computers
may communicate. Gregory, VANs in Japan: The Birth of an Industry, TELEPHONY, June 18, 1984,
at 79. Examples of VANs include electronic approval of credit card purchases, electronic money
transfers between banks, and computerized inventory systems that send information from retail out-
lets to a central management office. Japanese Telecom, supra note 7, at 81.
45 The 1971 revision of the 1953 Law fueled the power struggle between the Ministry and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"). See generally J. HILLS, supra note 1, at
108-09 (describing conflict between the Ministry and MITI). Formerly, the Ministry had jurisdic-
tion over telecommunications whereas MITI regulated the computer and data processing industries.
Hatano, The New Media Nebula, 31 JAPAN Q. 384, 388 (1984). The distinction between telecommu-
nications and computers faded, however, as the two were integrated into one system. Id. Neither
the Ministry nor MITI wanted to lose any regulatory power due to the 1971 revision. Ultimately,
the Diet granted the Ministry regulatory jurisdiction over data communication and VANs under
Japan's new telecommunications laws. Varner, supra note 24, at 31.
46 SEVENTEEN CoUNTRIEs, supra note 20, at 149.
47 Hatano, supra note 45, at 384-85. As early as the mid-1970s, MITI advocated further deregu-
lation of data communication in order to encourage private companies to offer new information
services. Komiya & Renaud, supra note 32, at 163. MITI believed that the NTT monopoly was
delaying the marriage of telecommunications and computers, a field labeled "compunications." Id.
MITI reasoned that if NTT hampered the development of Japan's compunications, then Japanese
electronics companies would be handicapped in foreign markets. Id. The Telecommunications Ad-
visory Council ("Advisory Council"), a Ministry appointed advisory body, subsequently shared
MITI's views. Consequently, in August 1981, the Advisory Council published, "A Vision of Tele-
communications Policy in the 1980's," which advocated deregulating data communication services
and VANs. Ito, supra note 1 at 74-75.
48 Hatano, supra note 45, at 384.
49 Sawada, supra note 9, at 85. In the latter half of the 1960s, NTT installed an average of three
million telephones per year. Ohashi, supra note 1, at 90. By March 1981, NTT serviced more than
39 million telephone line subscriptions. SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 138. Japan had
56.3 million telephones by March 1981, which worked out to 47.9 telephones for every 100 persons.
Id.
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nationwide. 5 By subsidizing local rates with expensive installation
charges and long-distance revenue, NTT fulfilled the statutory mandate
to charge uniformly low rates for local calls.5 '
The two laws were less successful at creating efficiency. NTT exper-
ienced limited success in operating an efficient telecommunications sys-
tem; nonetheless, NTT did generate profits. NTT earned $1.3 billion in
1983,52 up 3.9% from 1982,13 and $1.5 billion in 1984.14 Nevertheless,
NTT operated less efficiently than British Telecom and AT&T. For ex-
ample, in 1983, NTT profits represented a return of only 8.4% while
British Telecom mustered a 14.4% return and AT&T a 13% return.55
Moreover, by March 1985, the size of the NTT work force rivaled that of
AT&T-310,000 versus 390,000-but NTT generated only half as many
sales as AT&T. 6
The two former laws did succeed in cultivating Japan's domestic
telecommunications equipment industry. While NTT spread its business
among 200 to 300 Japanese companies, it purchased half of its telecom-
munications equipment from only four companies. 57 These four major
companies, along with seventeen smaller manufacturers from the
"Denden family," produced about 80% of Japan's telecommunications
equipment.58 In addition to satisfying most of its equipment needs with
Denden family products, NTT helped develop Denden family suppliers in
two other ways. First, these companies benefited from NTT's practice of
cooperating on research and development projects. 9 Second, many
NTT executives joined these companies as directors after retiring from
NIT.60 Finally, private companies offering data communication and
VAN services flourished as a result of the 1971 and 1982 revisions to the
50 Sawada, supra note 9, at 85.
51 J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 101, 105. The connection fee was about $400 in 1984. Id. at 105.
Long-distance rates sometimes cost 40 times more than local rates. Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7,
at 80.
52 Burgess, supra note 30, at 21, col. 2.
53 Leung, Japanese Investors Are on Tenterhooks, Waitingfor NYT Stock Price to Be Set, Asian
Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 24, col. 2.
54 Neff, Learning to Compete: Two Telephone Monopolies Take the Plunge into the Real World,
INT'L MGMT., Apr. 1985, at 32.
55 Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7, at 80-81.
56 Id. at 81. During 1984, NTT generated $65,500 in revenue for every employee while the Bell
operating companies produced $120,000 per employee. The Shinto Shake-up, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 23, 1985, at 17-18 [hereinafter Shinto Shake-up]. British Telecom produced only $40,000 per
employee in 1984. Id. at 18.
57 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 113. The four companies were Oki







B. Buying From Abroad
In an exchange of diplomatic letters dated December 19, 1980, Ja-
pan and the United States entered into the Procurement and Intercon-
nect Agreements which became effective January 1, 1981.62 Under the
Procurement Agreement, the two governments agreed to conform their
purchases of telecommunications equipment to standards outlined in the
GATT Government Procurement Code (the "Code"). 63 The Procure-
ment Agreement committed NTT to buy telecommunications equipment
based on a competitive basis and without discriminating against United
States manufacturers.' Along with the Procurement Agreement, the
61 IBM Japan, Ltd., and General Electric were the first companies to offer private data commu-
nication services after the Diet revised the 1953 Law in 1971. International Trade Issues in Telecom-
munications and Related Industries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37 (1983 statement by Harry L. Freeman, Senior Vice President, American Express
Co.)[hereinafter Freeman Statement]. IBM Japan, Ltd., began its CALL/370 service in early 1972.
Id. General Electric, in a joint venture with Dentsu, Japan's largest advertising firm, began its Mark
III service in early 1972 as well. Id. IBM Japan, Ltd., and General Electric enjoyed a combined
market share of 50% in the early 1980s. Id.
Information services grew quickly. In December 1979, 83 business, operating 122 systems, of-
fered data communication services. SEVENTEEN COUNTRIEs, supra note 20, at 150. By July 1984,
39 companies had received Ministry permission to operate VAN systems. Id. Companies operating
VAN services included Japan Information Services (an affiliate of Sumitomo Bank), Intec (a data
processing firm), and Japan's seven largest trucking companies. Hatano, supra note 45, at 385-86.
The growth of Japan's information services has exceeded that of Europe and North America. Ac-
cording to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), Japan's infor-
mation services grew by 25% annually between 1960 and 1977, compared to 19% in West Germany,
16% in Canada, 12% in France and the United States, and 11% in Great Britain. Freeman State-
ment, supra, at 37.
62 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 1.
63 Id.; see also Note, United States and Japanese Government Procurement: The Impact on
Trade Relations, 6 WASH. U.L.Q. 127, 161 (1984)[hereinafter Note, Procurement]. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
("GATT") is a multilateral agreement, adopted in 1948 and signed by more than 80 countries,
which prescribes rules limiting government intervention in international trade. Implementation of
the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Procurement Agreement Before the Subcomm. on Telecommuni-
cations, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1981)(statement by Robert C. Cassidy, Jr.)[hereinafter Implementation]. The
Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, held under the aegis of GATT, engendered the
Government Procurement Code. Id. at 19 (statement by W. Douglas Newkirk, Assistant United
States Trade Representative).
Both Japan and the United States are signatories to the Government Procurement Code; Japan
became a signatory in 1979. Note, Procurement, at 160. The United States Congress approved the
Government Procurement Code and implemented it under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 19
U.S.C. §§ 2501-82 (1982).
64 The Government Procurement Code requires signatory countries to conduct government pro-
curement so that all companies, domestic and foreign, are treated equally. Agreement on Govern-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:145(1987)
two countries issued the Interconnect Agreement which reduced trade
barriers to Japan's interconnect market. The Procurement and Intercon-
nect Agreements, therefore, constituted a step by Japan toward an inter-
nationally open telecommunications market.
1. The Procurement and Interconnect Agreements
Japan entered into the Procurement Agreement in order "to achieve
an open, transparent, and competitive telecommunications market" by
providing "non-discriminatory competitive opportunities to both domes-
tic and foreign manufacturers."6 Accordingly, the Procurement Agree-
ment included uniform procedural rules for making bids on NTT
procurement contracts.66 Under the procedural rules, NTT purchased
its equipment needs according to three tracks. NTT used Track I to
purchase "non-public telecommunications equipment," such as office
equipment, telephone pole erection vehicles, off-line computers, and
smaller telecommunications products.67 Track I procedures required a
prospective supplier to pre-qualify before submitting a bid.6 To pre-
qualify, a prospective supplier had to submit an application which in-
cluded a company resume, financial statements, business records, and
product samples.69 NTT then reviewed the application to ensure that the
ment Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, art. II(1), reprinted in THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS 35 (26th Supp. 1980)[hereinafter Basic Instruments]. The code also proscribes technical
specifications and certification requirements which inhibit international trade. Id. at 38-39; see also
Implementation, supra note 63, at 47 (Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., stated: "[t]he code has, as its basic
objective, nondiscrimination by governments in their purchasing activities.").
65 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 2 (letter of Dr. Saburo
Okita).
66 Id. at 5-19. The procedural rules were important to foreign suppliers because they offered a
ready vehicle into Japan's telecommunications market. NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at
27 (Olmer Statement). Procedural rules provide "a formal process for procurement from foreign
firms where none existed before." Id.
67 Implementation, supra note 63, at 82 (statement by John Morgan, Communications Workers
of America, AFL-CIO). Other products subject to Track I bidding procedures include polyethylene
coated steel pipes, oscilloscopes, magnetic tapes, microwave frequency counters, paper products,
PBXs, data terminal equipment, modems, facsimiles, and storage batteries. Id. at 82. Track I prod-
ucts are commercially available and need not be standardized. Yoshimine, Settlement Finally
Reached for NTT Procurement Issue, Bus. JAPAN, Mar. 1981, at 75.
68 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 119. NTTI uses the pre-qualification
process to screen out unreliable companies. Note, United States-Japan Trade Developments Under
the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 139, 172 (1981)[hereinaf-
ter Note, MTNAgreement]. The United States also screens prospective bidders to prevent unreliable
companies from tendering bids on government procurement. Id. at 157 n.96. United States con-
tracting officers must adhere to criteria outlined in procurement regulations when determining a
supplier's reliability. In Japan, however, the ministries determine their own criteria for screening.
Id.
69 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 119.
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supplier met capitalization, creditworthiness, production, and quality
requirements.70
Tracks II and III covered procurement of "public telecommunica-
tions equipment," such as carriers' transmission equipment, electronic
switchboards, on-line computers, radio units, cable, car phones, and telex
terminals. 71 Track II procedures applied to purchases of standard tele-
communications equipment or equipment which only required modifica-
tion to meet NTT standards.72 NTT followed Track III procedures to
solicit bids on public telecommunications equipment still in the experi-
mental stages. 73 Tracks II and III consolidated the pre-qualification and
bidding into one step.74 Along with its bid, a prospective supplier had to
submit an application with supporting documents.75  NTT then ex-amined the supplier's background, manufacturing facilities, and sample
products so as to assess the company's reliability76 and to ensure its abil-
ity to meet NTT standards for quality control.77
Along with the Procurement Agreement, Japan and the United
States issued the Interconnect Agreement.78  This agreement further
opened Japan's interconnect market to United States equipment suppli-
ers.7 9 Under this agreement, Japan promised to make "type approval
70 Id. All of NTT's procurement under Track I was subject to the Government Procuremnt
Code. Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 5; Implementation, supra
note 63, at 3 (statement by Raymond J. Waldmann, Assistant Secretary for International Economic
Policy, Department of Commerce). Consequently, pre-qualified companies of any signatory nation
had nondiscriminatory, competitive access to Track I procurement contracts. The Government Pro-
curement Code, however, does not cover Tracks II and III. Procurement in Telecommunications
Agreement, supra note 21, at 3; note, MTNAgreement, supra note 68, at 173.
71 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 118 n.151. Sales under Tracks II and
III were more important to United States suppliers than sales under Track I. Id. at 118. Tracks II
and III covered "high technology and high dollar volume public telecommunications equipment"
which United States companies sold most competitively. Id.
72 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 5.
73 Id. at 5-6.
74 Id. at 6-17; Note, MTNAgreement, supra note 68, at 174 n.217.
75 Note, MTNAgreement, supra note 68, at 174.
76 For a list of NTT's criteria used for evaluating foreign Track II and III bidders, see Id. at 174
n.219.
77 Id. at 174-75. Japan only granted companies from the United States the right to bid on NTT
procurement contracts under Tracks II and III. Id. at 171. Although the Japanese refused to sub-
mit procurement under Tracks II and III to the Government Procurement Code, the government
felt that the procedures under Tracks II and III conformed to the Code. Procurement in Telecom-
munications Agreement, supra note 21, at 3 (letter of Dr. Saburo Okita).
78 Although the two countries appended the Interconnect Agreement to the Procurement Agree-
ment, they concluded the Interconnect Agreement separately on June 2, 1979. Note, Japanese Tele-
communications, supra note 10, at 120 n.164. Unlike the Procurement Agreement, which
terminated on December 31, 1983, the Interconnect Agreement has no termination date. See Pro-
curement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 24-25.
79 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 24-25; Note, Japanese
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available for all classes of [CPE],"8 ° to grant or deny type approval
within two months in most cases, 8' and to base type approval on domes-
tic or foreign test data.82 To receive type approval, however, all CPE had
to conform to NTT technical standards.83 Japan also promised to com-
plete required CPE installation inspections within two weeks of the in-
spection request.
84
2. The Effect of the Agreements
The Procurement Agreement opened up Japan's telecommunica-
tions equipment market to many foreign suppliers. By December 1982,
ninety-one foreign companies, including forty-three from the United
States,85 pre-qualified under Track I to bid on forty-eight products, in-
cluding magnetic tape and high-speed modems.86 By May 1983, thirty-
three foreign companies had bid successfully on twenty-eight products
under Track 1.87 Under the terms of the Interconnect Agreement, five
United States companies succeeded in obtaining type approval to sell
Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 120. The Japanese interconnect market is important to
United States telecommunications equipment manufacturers. In 1983, the interconnect market ac-
counted for 45% of Japan's $4.3 billion telecommunications equipment market. Japanese Telecoms,
supra note 7, at 81.
80 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 24. Previously, NTT re-
quired individual approval-approval of each CPE terminal sold-rather that type approval. SEV-
ENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 153. Type approval, however, permits the supplier to sell the
same CPE product without reinspection so long as the design remains unchanged. Telecommunica-
tions Standards, supra note 20, at 10. Type approval is valid for five years. Fees range from $425 for
a facsimile with acoustic couplings to $2,000 for a PBX. Id. at 12-13.
81 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 25. Since companies nor-
mally negotiate equipment design and specifications prior to submitting test data, the type approval
process takes several months. Telecommunications Standards, supra note 20, at 12.
82 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 25. Although NTT ac-
cepted test data generated by the United States suppliers and reputable testing laboratories, in prac-
tice NTT usually required duplicative testing by its labs. Telecommunications Standards, supra note
20, at 12.
83 SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 153.
84 Procurement in Telecommunications Agreement, supra note 21, at 25. After the customer
hires an NTT-licensed installation engineer to hook up the CPE terminal, NTT also inspects the
installation. Telecommunications Standards, supra note 20, at 14. This inspection bears no charge.
Id. Once NTT inspects and approves the connection, the line is turned on. Id.
85 Procurement Code Hearing, supra note 15, at 47 (statement by William E. Brock, United
States Trade Representative ("USTR")).
86 SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 151.
87 Id. Motorola was one of the successful bidders from the United States. In May 1982, Motor-
ola won a procurement contract valued at $8 million from NTT to deliver 45,000 pocket pagers.
Procurement Code Hearing, supra note 15, at 48 (Brock Statement). Motorola's success was atypi-
cal, however. Out of 117 contracts for which NTT solicited bids, only 11 United States companies
won contracts. Id. at 62 (Olmer Statement).
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eleven types of CPE by April 1983.88
Despite the apparent success of United States companies in pene-
trating Japan's telecommunications market, United States sales were
meager compared to NTT's $3 billion annual procurement budget.8 9
United States sales totaled $15.2 million and $40 million respectively in
1981 and 1982, the first two years of the Procuremnt Agreement.90 Fur-
thermore, the items sold were relatively low-technology products.91
These sales, therefore, did nothing to remedy the trade imbalance be-
tween Japan and the United States in telecommunications equipment.9 z
United States trade officials provided several reasons for the unex-
pectedly low sales to NTT. First, NTT's mature working relationships
with Denden family companies made many United States manufacturers
skeptical about NTT's' interest in procuring foreign-made equipment.
93
As a result, these manufacturers were unwilling to invest sales efforts on
NTT.94 Other United States manufacturers stressed the poor political
prospects of not buying United States products rather than emphasizing
the quality of their products. 95 United States manufacturers also failed
to bid on a large number of NTT procurement announcements. 96 In ad-
dition, NTT offered few bidding opportunities under Tracks II and III
for high-priced, high-technology items, such as central switching and
88 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 121-22. For example, NTT had
granted type approval to Paradyne for high speed modems, ITT for telephones, Plantronix for light
weight headsets, and ROLM for digital PBXs. Procurement Code Hearing, supra note 15, at 66
(Olmer Statement).
89 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 6-7 (Brock Statement).
90 Id. at 7.
91 Id.
92 Robertson, NIT Treaty: Sayonara?, Electronic News, Aug. 19, 1985, at 11. Besides frustra-
tion over meager United States sales to NTT under the Procurement Agreement, the mounting trade
imbalance in telecommunications equipment between Japan and the United States during 1981 and
1982 exacerbated United States concern. In 1981, Japan imported $15.2 million worth of telecom-
munications equipment from the United States but exported $216 million of the same to the United
States. In 1982, Japan imported $39.6 million in equipment from the United States, but exported
$311 million worth to the United States. Fuchs, Regulatory Reform and Japan's Telecommunica-
tions Revolution, 1983-84 HARV. U. PROGRAM ON U.S.-JAPAN REL: ANN. REV. at 123-24. During
this same period, employment in the United States telecommunications equipment industry dropped
14.2%. Id.
Robert B. Wood, a spokesman for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, testi-
fied before the Trade Policy Staff Committee in Washington, D.C., that the trade figures "do not
reflect reciprocal trade access," a policy goal under the Procurement Agreement. Id. Wood noted
further that "the benefits envisioned during the NTT negotiations have not materialized in the em-
ployment area, but rather have deteriorated." Id.
93 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 8 (Brock Statement).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Procurement Code Hearing, supra note 15, at 47 (Brock Statement).
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transmission equipment.9 7  Finally, onerous pre-qualification and ap-
proval procedures,9 8 rigid purchasing specifications, short bid deadlines,
and purchases in lots too small to attract United States companies also
contributed to the low level of purchases. 99
As a result of the perceived failure of the agreement, the United
States Trade Representative, William E. Brock, III, met in February
1983 with Dr. Hisashi Shinto, president of NTT." Thereafter, NTT
made some procedural changes to accommodate United States manufac-
turers, such as more flexible purchasing specifications and longer bid
deadlines. 1° ' NTT also aggregated purchases into commercially attrac-
tive quantities"°2 and started accepting bids in English and at its New
York office.1
0 3
Although United States sales to NTT increased dramatically during
1983-rising to approximately $142 million-they still disappointed
United States expectations."° While NTT did purchase some high-tech-
nology products, no purchases involved major network components,
such as central switching equipment.10 5 Even at a level of $142 million,
sales by United States manufacturers to NTT were insignificant com-
pared to its $3 billion annual procurement budget.'0 6
97 Id. at 63 (Olmer Statement).
98 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 122. Initially, C. Itoh & Co., one of
Japan's major trading companies, reacted enthusiastically to NTT's open procurement policy. C.
Itoh spent more than one year reviewing European and United States products to import and sell to
NTT under Track I. C. Itoh later scrapped the project. Pre-qualification applications required ex-
cessively detailed information, such as lists of products manufactured in each of the supplier's facto-
ries. Furthermore, the applications requested confidential information about the supplier's
production costs. Rather than irritate foreign customers by requesting this detailed and confidential
information for pre-qualification applications, C. Itoh decided against pursuing NTT's procurement
contracts. Yoshimine, supra note 67, at 77.
99 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 7-8 (Brock Statement); Procurement Code Hear-
ing, supra note 15, at 63 (Olmer Statement).




104 Id. at 9. The $142 million figure was three times greater than the 1982 figure of $40 million
and was nine times greater than the $15 million figure given in 1981. See supra note 90 and accom-
panying text.
105 N7T Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 3, 9 (Brock Statement). Sales of major network
components necessitate a long-term business relationship with the supplier and thereby enhance the
potential for future sales. Id.
106 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 122-23. Under the Procurement
Agreement, the telecommunications trade imbalance continued to grow. Between 1980 and 1984,
overall telecommunications imports to the United States increased 166% while exports grew only
40%. Schwartz, House Units Approve Bill to Open Foreign Telecom Markets, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
Nov. 18, 1985, at 59, col. 5. During the same four year period, telecommunications imports from
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3. Renewal of the Procurement Agreement
On January 30, 1984, Japanese and United States officials signed a
three-year extension ("Second Procurement Agreement") of the original
Procurement Agreement.1"7 The Second Procurement Agreement con-
tained some modifications, including a termination option, available at
any time, and a provision for an annual joint review in order to monitor
the agreement's effectiveness at generating United States sales in Ja-
pan.108  Under the Second Procurement Agreement, Japan agreed to
consider more seriously United States companies bidding for Track III
research and development contracts. 0 9 It also agreed to set reasonable
technical specifications 110 and not to insist on joint development projects
when United States companies could meet NTT's needs with products
already available."' Japan even consented to a clause whereby the
agreement's terms would remain binding on NTT even if the Diet trans-
formed NTT into a private corporation.
112
Japan rose almost 250% while United States telecommunications exports to Japan grew only 125%.
Id.
107 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 11 (Brock Statement). At least three reasons led
the United States to renew the Procurement Agreement. First, it created new business opportunities
by providing equal access to NTT's procurement-40% of Japan's entire telecommunications mar-
ket. Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 124. Second, access to NTT procure-
ment under Tracks II and III gave United States telecommunications manufacturers exposure to
NTT's research and development which were at the forefront of the industry. NYT Procurement
Hearing, supra note 5, at 27 (Olmer Statement). Third, the Procurement Agreement promoted two
United States policy goals: 1) open international markets in telecommunications; and 2) a reduced
trade deficit. NYT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 27 (Olmer Statement).
108 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at I1 (Brock Statement).
109 Under the Procurement Agreement, United States telecommunications manufacturers exper-
ienced little success in bidding on Track III research and development contracts. NIT Procurement
Hearing, supra note 5, at 19 (Brock Statement). Winning Track III procurement contracts was
important to United States companies because once a company developed a telecommunications
product for NTT under Track III, it stood a better chance of bidding successfully on the subsequent
Track II production contract. Id. at 19-20. Consequently, more Track III contracts secured by
United States companies would mean more Track II sales to NTT. Id. at 35 (Olmer Statement).
110 In addition to setting reasonable technical specifications, NTT reduced the amount of techni-
cal documentation necessary for type approval. For example, in 1982, when ROLM first applied for
type approval for its digital PBX system, NTT required 2,000 pages of documentation in Japanese.
Sease, US. Firms Assert Japanese Aren't Giving Them Fair Access to Big Telecommunications Mar-
ket, Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1985, at 32, col. 3. When ROLM filed another type approval in 1984, the
application only required 100 pages of documentation in English. Id. Therefore, under the Second
Procurement Agreement, NTT eliminated part of the onerous approval procedures which discour-
aged United States companies from bidding on NTT procurement contracts. See supra note 98 and
accompanying text.
111 NT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 10-11 (Brock Statement).
112 Id. at 21. Japan and the United States agreed on November 12, 1986, to a second three-year
extension of the Procurement Agreement beginning in January 1987. Economy & Business, Japan
Econ. J., Nov. 15, 1986, at 2, col. 4.
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While the terms of the Second Procurement Agreement improved
access to NTT procurement for United States suppliers, NTT purchased
less equipment from United States companies in 1984 ($130 million) than
in 1983 ($142 million). 13 This decline occurred despite three encourag-
ing trends. First, by the end of 1984, NTT planned to purchase equip-
ment and materials totaling Y560 trillion, up 16% from 1983.114
Second, NTT's New York office received a "sizeable increase" in inquir-
ies by United States companies.115 Third, NTT sponsored seminars for
United States companies concerning NTT teletex communication sys-
tems and NTT research in fiber optics." 6 Therefore, the Second Pro-
curement Agreement, like the first agreement, failed to reduce Japan's
trade surplus with the United States in telecommunications equipment
by failing to increase United States sales to NTT.
C. The Switch to Private Telecommunications
1. Political Factors
The political climate during the early 1980s encouraged the Diet to
end NTT's telecommunications monopoly." 7 In July 1982, the Second
Ad Hoe Committee on Administrative Reform (the "Committee")" 8
recommended converting NTT into a private company to improve its
efficiency. In a report submitted to the Prime Minister, the Committee
recommended breaking up NTT into private regional carriers with mo-
nopolies over local exchange service. 119 For long-distance service, the
Committee recommended a competitive market open to all private tele-
communications carriers.
120
The Ministry and the Liberal Democratic Party (the "LDP") origi-
113 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 396. The $130 million figure represented
only 6% of NTT's 1984 procurement budget. J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 115. In contrast, approxi-
mately 80% of NTT's equipment acquisitions in 1984 came from 10 "Denden family" companies.
Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7, at 81. Sales by NEC Corporation and Fujitsu accounted for 40%
of NTT's purchases during 1984. Id.
114 JETRO, supra note 5, at 3.
115 NTT Procurement Hearing, supra note 5, at 12 (Brock Statement).
116 Id.
117 See J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 143.
118 Former Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki commissioned the committee in March 1981 to review
government administration and suggest ways to cut government spending and reduce bureaucracy.
Ohashi, supra note 1, at 9 1. The Committee investigated NTT during its review. See J. HILLS, supra
note 1, at 139.
119 Ohashi, supra note 1, at 92-93. The government would sell off shares in the local companies,
thereby making the local companies wholly independent. Id. at 93.
120 Id. at 92-93. This proposed system of local monopolies and competitive long distance carriers
paralleled the present telecommunications system in the United States. See Bonus, Japanese Tele-
communications: Reforms and Trade Implications, 28 CAL. MGMT. REV. 43, 60 n.12 (1986).
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nally opposed the Committee's recommendation to turn NTT into a pri-
vate company. 121 The Ministry changed its views, however, after
conducting its own studies which indicated that competition should be
introduced into Japan's telecommunications industry.122 By September
1983, the LDP agreed with the Ministry, concluding that the Diet should
enact new telecommunications laws which would create a competitive
market. 123
In addition to these political trends, Dr. Hisashi Shinto influenced
the Diet's decision to transform NTT into a private company. 124 Dr.
Shinto had been NTT's president since 1980.125 As a vocal proponent of
making Japan's telecommunications market private,12 6 Dr. Shinto be-
lieved that preserving the NTT monopoly wasted national resources and
impeded the potential of Japan's telecommunications industry.127 He
supported the Procurement Agreement because it made available new
technology and products from the United States.
128
Two other political forces contributed to the Diet's decision to enact
the new telecommunications laws. First, the growth of the VAN market
and the potential elimination of the standard telephone requirement
made Japanese equipment manufacturers recognize that they no longer
depended solely on sales to the NTT monopoly. 129  Selling directly to
VAN companies and consumers in a private market offered promising
121 DOING BUSINESS WrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 367.
122 Murray, "My Aim Is to Revitalize the Structure and Operations of N7T, "J. JAPANESE TRADE
& INDUS., July-Aug. 1983, at 51.
123 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2.
124 See J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 113.
125 Fuchs, supra note 92, at 137. Dr. Shinto, the first NTT president from the private sector,
succeeded Tokuji Akikusa, a proponent of NTT's monopoly. Yoshimine, supra note 67, at 76.
Akikusa resigned from NTT in protest of the Procurement Agreement. Japanese Telecoms, supra
note 7, at 81.
By appointing an outsider like Dr. Shinto, the cabinet installed a leader who favored competi-
tion over a government monopoly. Fuchs, supra note 92, at 137. Before joining NTT, Dr. Shinto
was an engineer for Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries ("IHI"), a shipbuilding company.
Chipello, N7T President Is Playing a Prime Role In Japan's New Information Society, Asian Wall St.
J., Dec. 10, 1984, at 3, col. 4. Shinto served as IHI's president from 1972 to 1979, id. at 25, col. 1,
and, interestingly, assumed that role from Toshio Doko, former chairman of the Keidanren and head
of the Second Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative Reform-the committee which recommended
making NTT private. Id. at 3, cols. 3-4.
126 In an interview from August 1983, Dr. Shinto remarked:
We have seen how disastrous it is to maintain a government monopoly which leads to inflexibil-
ity and heavy financial losses .... [Tihere should not be these huge government enterprises
enjoying a monopoly, but rather.. .there should be healthy competition to benefit society as a
whole through better service and lower prices.
Murray, supra note 122, at 52.
127 Fuchs, supra note 92, at 137.
128 Procurement Code Hearing, supra note 15, at 61-62 (Olmer Statement).
129 J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 138.
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prospects for more sales and higher profits.13 Second, the railroads and
utility companies wanted to sell the spare capacity of their own private
telecommunications systems. 131 Consequently, political pressure came
from powerful companies as well as from political organizations to con-
vert the NTT monopoly into a private telecommunications system.
132
2. Practical Considerations
Several practical considerations encouraged the Diet to enact the
new telecommunications laws. For example, once NTT established na-
tionwide telephone service in 1978, the annual demand for new telephone
lines decreased dramatically. 133 As services such as installation charges,
basic fees, and dialing charges accounted for 90% of NTT's revenues,
NTT's income decreased as well. 134 At the same time, operating costs
increased. 135 This trend required either raising telephone rates to meet
increasing operation costs or altering NTT's structure so that it operated
more efficiently.
136
Another practical consideration was that technological innovations
had dated three considerations which had shaped the PCL and the 1953
Law. First, the Diet gave NIT a monopoly over telecommunications to
protect the government's large capital investment from competition.
137
New technology, however, such as microwave transmission, optical fiber
cable, and satellites, made such large capital investments unnecessary. 138
Consequently, smaller investments for constructing new circuits required
less protection from competition. Second, the Diet originally created a
monopoly to provide economies of scale. 139 Yet satellites and fiber optics
produced these economies of scale in service areas smaller than a na-
tional telecommunications network."o Finally, while uniform standards
were necessary in 1952 to allow all portions of the network to communi-
cate, modem interface technology connected incompatible systems so
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 139.
133 Id. at 104. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, NTT installed about three million new
telephone lines each year. SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 155. After 1978, however, the
demand for new telephone lines decreased to 1.2 million requests per year. Id.
134 Yoshimine, supra note 67, at 76. In 1984, telephone service charges and telecommunications
equipment rentals accounted for 88% of NTT's gross revenue. Doe, Japan's $20 Billion Telecom
Giant at the Crossroads, ELECTRONIC Bus., Oct. 1, 1985, at 132, 134.
135 SEVENTEEN COUNTRIES, supra note 20, at 155.
136 Ohashi, supra note 1, at 91.
137 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
138 Burgess, supra note 30, at 21, col. 2.
139 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
140 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 368.
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that they could converse.
141
3. Policy Factors
Once NTT had established nationwide telephone service,142 three
new policy concerns led the Diet to enact the new telecommunications
laws. First, simple telephone and telegraph service no longer satisfied
sophisticated consumer demands.'43 As the exclusive supplier of all tele-
communications services, NTT had limited its services and regulated the
equipment available to consumers. 144 If a consumer wanted an addi-
tional service or advanced CPE that NTT disallowed, then the consumer
had to do without the additional service and advanced CPE.145 Conse-
quently, the Diet designed the new laws to introduce competition into
Japan's market so as to encourage carriers and equipment manufacturers
to offer consumers a wider selection of services and equipment.146
Second, the Diet concluded that competition would increase the effi-
ciency of Japan's telecommunications system.147 The NTT monopoly
had promised efficiency because it prevented duplicative investment and
provided economies of scale.148 In the 1980s, however, a competitive
market could outperform a monopoly and still protect against duplica-
tive investment while creating economies of scale. For example, govern-
ment regulation to curb excessive competition would discourage
duplicative investment 149 and networks utilizing satellites and fiber optics
would create economies of scale in small service areas. 150 Consequently,
the Diet enacted the new telecommunications laws to encourage greater
141 Sawada, supra note 9, at 85. The accelerating pace of technological innovation in telecommu-
nications also outpaced Japan's regulatory distinctions. For example, MITI formerly regulated the
computer industry while the Ministry regulated telecommunications. When the Diet amended the
1953 Law to permit private companies to connect computers to telecommunications circuits, MITI
and MPT regulations overlapped. New rules redefining each ministry's jurisdiction were needed.
Fuchs, supra note 92, at 127; see also supra note 45.
142 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
143 Shinto, supra note 20, at 380.
144 See J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 139.
145 The New Telecommunications Business Law, Look Japan, Apr. 10, 1985, at 14, col. 1 [herein-
after New Business Law].
146 Murray, supra note 122, at 520.
147 New Business Law, supra note 145, at 14, col. 2.
148 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. But see Yamashita, NTT and the Move to
Value-Added Services, 21 Mitsui Trade News 4 (1984)(efficiency of monopoly doubted because no
competition to create incentive).
149 To avoid duplicative investment and competition, the TBL grants MPT discretion over the
number of companies permitted to compete in different market segments. See infra note 206 and
accompanying text.
150 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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efficiency. 
1 5 1
Third, to reduce Japan's trade surplus and avoid protectionist sanc-
tions against Japanese exports, the Diet felt compelled to open up Japan's
telecommunications market to foreign competitors. Although the Pro-
curement Agreement permitted NTT to purchase equipment from for-
eign manufacturers, 152  Japan's continuing trade surplus in
telecommunications equipment 153 elicited foreign demands, particularly
from the United States, for greater market access and fair competition. 1
54
Therefore, the Diet also drafted the new laws to give foreign companies
increased access to Japan's telecommunications market.
D. The Private Telecommunications Laws
Japan's private telecommunications laws took effect April 1, 1985.
The Telecommunications Business Law (the "TBL") established a "regu-
lated competitive" market for Japanese telecommunications.155  The
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Act (the "NTT Act")
ended NTT's monopoly and transformed it into a private corporation
with private management.
151 See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
153 By 1984, Japan had a Y294.9 billion telecommunications trade surplus with the United States
and a Y532 billion telecommunications trade surplus internationally. DOING BUSINESS WITH JA-
PAN, supra note 2, at 385.
154 Fuchs, supra note 92, at 125. Japan's telecommunications trade surplus with the United States
even provoked United States threats to abrogate the Second Procurement Agreement. On March 13,
1985, while the Ministry was drafting ordinances to implement the TBL, United States Deputy
Trade Representative Michael Smith warned that the United States might cancel the Second Pro-
curement Agreement unless Japan made major concessions. These concessions included limiting
technical regulations to those necessary to protect the network (the same standard employed under
Part 68 of FCC regulations), eliminating discrimination between foreign and domestic suppliers, and
simplifying procedures for registration and equipment approval. DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN,
supra note 2, at 385-86. Cancelling the agreement would have permitted the United States to impose
restrictions on imports of Japanese telecommunications products, which were worth Y322.359 bil-
lion in 1984. Id. at 385.
155 Foster, supra note 9, at 9. In contrast to the Diet's desire to create a competitive telecommu-
nications market, Japan had other interests that required continued government regulation. For
example, Japanese consumers had to be assured of dependable service since telecommunications
service is indispensable to daily life. EMBASSY OF JAPAN, REFORM OF JAPAN'S TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS LEGISLATION 1, 3-4 (Dec. 20, 1984)[hereinafter EMBASSY REPORT]: cf. Sawada, supra note
9, at 89 (telecommunications grouped with electricity, gas, and transportation as public welfare in-
dustries subject to regulatory supervision). Furthermore, the rapid growth of telecommunications
sparked concern about national security, personal privacy, the pace and extent to which telecommu-
nications would internationalize Japan, and the impact on national economics and social cohesion.
Fuchs, supra note 92, at 126. Finally, Japan had an interest in directing the development of telecom-




L The Telecommunications Business Law of 1984
The TBL establishes a comprehensive plan for Japanese telecommu-
nications: it describes its purpose, classifies telecommunications carriers,
sets forth the terms under which they will be authorized to operate, and
outlines the administrative procedures for having telecommunications
equipment approved. According to Article 1 of the TBL, the purpose of
the law is to promote the public welfare by securing dependable telecom-
munications service, protecting users' interests, and ensuring "the sound
development of telecommunications." '156 To promote the public welfare,
Article 3 prohibits censorship, Article 4 guarantees the secrecy of com-
munications, Article 7 prohibits carriers from unfairly discriminating in
providing telecommunications service, and Article 8 requires carriers to
give priority to emergency communications.
1 57
The TBL classifies carriers into two categories: Type I and Type
HI.158 Type I carriers provide basic telephone and other services by oper-
ating their own circuit facilities; 5 9 Type II carriers lease Type I carriers'
circuits. 6 The TBL further subdivides Type II carriers as Special and
General.61 Special Type II carriers operate at a capacity of 500 or more
standard telephone lines and provide services to which anyone may sub-
scribe.162 A Type II carrier that offers international telecommunications
service always qualifies as a Special Type II carrier.1 6 3 General Type II
carriers operate on less than 500 standard telephone lines' 64 and nor-
mally service small groups, such as lines between a manufacturer and a
wholesaler, between a parent corporation and a subsidiary, or among
chain stores. 165
The TBL and Ministry ordinances regulate the entry and manage-
ment of Type I carriers. The Ministry must approve and license a Type I
carrier before it may begin operations. 6 6 The Ministry grants a license
to establish a Type I carrier if the applicant will create no excess circuit
156 TBL art. 1.
157 Id. arts. 34, 7-8. Many articles of the TBL, such as 19, 28, and 37-39, also mention public
interest as a paramount concern.
158 Id. art. 6(l).
159 Id. art. 6(2); see also New Business Law, supra note 145, at 14, col. 2. Telecommunications
circuit facilities include transmission lines, switchboards, and other devices used to transmit tele-
phonic messages and information between end terminals, such as telephones, facsimiles, and PBXs.
160 TBL art. 6(3); see also New Business Law, supra note 145, at 14, col. 2.
161 TBL art. 21(1).
162 Id. art. 21(3); DOING BUSINESS WrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 389-90.
163 TBL art. 21(3); DOING BUSINESS WrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 389.
164 TBL art. 21(2); DOING BUSINESS WrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 372.
165 DOING BUSINESS wrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 372.
166 TBL art. 9(1).
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facilities in its service area, obtain adequate financial backing and techni-
cal capacity, submit a feasible business plan, and further "the sound de-
velopment of telecommunications."' 6 7 The Ministry automatically will
deny Type I status if the applicant is a foreign government, a foreign
corporation, a Japanese corporation one-third or more of whose officers
are foreign or whose share of foreign capital exceeds one-third, or is not a
Japanese citizen. 6 ' Before a Type I carrier may suspend or discontinue
service, it must receive Ministry approval. 169 The Ministry also must
approve a Type I carrier's rates. 170 Finally, a Type I carrier must receive
Ministry permission to interconnect with other Type I carriers and to
subcontract any of its business activities.17'
Similarly, the TBL and Ministry ordinances regulate the entry and
management of Type II carriers. As long as a Type II carrier uses cir-
cuits leased from Type I carriers, the TBL permits Type II carriers to
offer any type of telecommunications service, except for telegraph ser-
vice.' 72 The TBL places no limits on foreign ownership of Type II carri-
ers. 173 Furthermore, it exempts Type II carriers' rates from Ministry
regulation' 74 although a Special Type II carrier must submit to the Min-
istry a copy of its rate schedule before putting them into effect. 175
A Special Type II carrier must register with the Ministry176 while a
General Type II carrier need only notify the Ministry of its intent to
operate. 177 In order to register with the Ministry, a Special Type II car-
rier must submit its name and address, a description of its services, a map
167 Id. art. 10.
168 Id. art. 1 l(iv)-(vii). The restriction on foreign capital guarantees that foreign interests will
have no more than a one-third interest in voting rights. The purpose of the foreign investment
restriction is to prevent foreign control over Japanese telecommunications. DOING BUSINESS WITH
JAPAN, supra note 2, at 382-83. In the United States, Congress limits foreign ownership of a tele-
communications carrier to one-fifth of the capital stock. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)(3) (1982).
169 TBL art. 18(1). The Ministry prevents excessive and overlapping service. Id. art. 10(i)-(ii);
see infra note 206 and accompanying text. Therefore, if a Type I carrier discontinues service, its
service area will have limited telephone service. DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at
370. As a result, the Ministry must consider the public interest before permitting a Type I carrier to
discontinue service. Id.
170 TBL art. 31(1).
171 Id. arts. 38(1), 15(1). A Type I carrier hooks up with other Type I carriers in order to provide
service to areas beyond its own service area. Shinto, supra note 20, at 381.
172 Fuchs, supra note 92, at 135.
173 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 370, 384. The Ministry's original draft of the
TBL placed a 50% foreign ownership limit on Special Type II carriers. Without this limit, the
Ministry feared that United States companies would saturate the market and stunt the growth of
domestically owned Special Type II carriers. Id. at 384.
174 Shinto, supra note 20, at 382.
175 TBL art. 31(5)(6).
176 Id. art. 24(1).
177 Id. art. 22(1). The TBL requires a Special Type II carrier to register because the public
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of its circuit facilities, and a business plan.17 After registering, a Special
Type II carrier may commence business within twenty days. 17 9 In con-
trast, a General Type II carrier must simply notify the Ministry by sub-
mitting its name and address and a description of its services.18 0
The TBL authorizes the Ministry to select a designated approval
agency ("DAA") to inspect all telecommunications equipment 8 1 and
certify that it meets Ministry standards."8 2 The Ministry designated the
Japan Approvals Agency for Telecommunications Equipment
("JATE"), an independent examination company, as Japan's sole
DAA. 183 JATE must certify all CPE before it is connected to a carrier's
circuits.'84 JATE certifies both domestic and foreign CPE based on the
welfare is affected by a Special Type II network due to its national network and volume of data flow.
DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 375.
178 TBL art. 24(2)(3). A corporate annual report or a statement from a financial institution is
sufficient to verify the financial credibility of a Special Type II carrier. DOING BUSINESS WITH
JAPAN, supra note 2, at 389. Approval of a Special Type II carrier's registration is automatic if its
operations comply with published Ministry ordinances. New Business Law, supra note 145, at 14,
col. 3.
179 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 388-89. When the Ministry discovers a prob-
lem in a registration, the Ministry must notify the Special Type II carrier within 15 days of the
submittal date. Id. at 389. If the Ministry rejects a registration, it must notify the Special Type II
carrier within 30 days and include written reasons for rejection. Id.
180 TBL art. 22(1). The Ministry immediately accepts all General Type II carrier notifications;
no approval is necessary.
181 TBL art. 68(1); see also Joint Report on Sectoral Discussions, Jan. 10, 1986, United States-
Japan (Attachment I (A)(4)), reprinted in Japan, US. Conclude MOSS Trade Talks, Japan Econ. J.,
Jan. 25, 1986, at 4, cols. 4-5)[hereinafter MOSS Talks]. Once the NTT Act converted NTT into a
private corporation, fair competition dictated that the Ministry delegate inspection and certification
authority to a neutral party. TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 20, § 2 at 5.
182 Under the TBL, the Ministry lowered technical standards for telecommunications equipment
to the level necessary to prevent harm to a network. D. ABELSON, MARKET-ORIENTED SECTOR-
SELECTIVE (M.O.S.S.) TELECOMMUNICATIONS TALKS: FINAL REPORT 8 (1986) (draft); see also
Davis, supra note 13, at 10, col. 1 (new Ministry technical standards parallel FCC standards); cf. 47
C.F.R. § 68.1 (1985)(FCC standards for telecommunications equipment set at level to protect tele-
phone network from harm). Formerly, the Ministry adhered to a policy that telecommunications
equipment standards should protect Japanese consumers from inferior products. Japan Phone Rules
Argues, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at D23, col. 4. For example, one former Ministry regulation
required all telephones to make the same buzzing noise to indicate that the telephone on the other
end was ringing. Browning, US. Welcomes Japan's Actions On Phone Gear, Wall St. J., Apr. 22,
1985, at 33, col. 1. Another former regulation set standards for how clearly CPE transmitted voices.
See Chira, Japanese to Ease Technology Curbs, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1985, at A35, col. 5.
183 M. Foster, Japanese Telecommunications Terminal Equipment Certification and Procedures 6
(May 1985)[hereinafter Equipment Certification].
184 Equipment Certification, supra note 183, at 9. The Electronics Industries Association, coop-
erating with the USTR and the Department of Commerce, has established an office in Japan to assist
United States suppliers filing CPE certification applications with JATE. New Telecommunications
Certification Plan Said to Allow Better US. Access to Market, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 781, 782
(1985)[hereinafter Certification Plan]. JATE requires companies to submit applications in Japanese
at its Japan offices. Id.
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manufacturer's test data.18 5
The TBL requires Type I carriers to inspect all connections between
Type I carrier's circuits and CPE1 s6 before a consumer may use the CPE.
The inspection assures that the connection meets Ministry installation
standards for interface compatibility. 187 The Ministry defers to the inter-
face compatibility standards set by the Telecommunications Advisory
Council, I88 which is composed in part of Japanese citizens employed by
subsidiaries of foreign companies.
189
2. The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Act of 1984
Under the NTT Act, NTT became a joint stock company ("Private
NTT") organized to operate a domestic telecommunications business. 190
Although both the Japanese government and private investors now own
private NTT stock, the NTT Act requires the government to retain own-
ership of at least one-third of Private NTT's voting shares. 191 In addi-
185 Id. JATE's acceptance of a manufacturer's test data saves foreign suppliers the expense and
time delay which result from sending samples for inspection. INFORMATION & TELECOMMUNICA-
TION TECHNOLOGIES GROUP, JAPAN LIBERALIZES TELECOMMUNICATIONS: SLOWLY BUT
SURELY, Special Report No. 3, 3 (Apr. 1985). If JATE initially refuses to certify telecommunica-
tions equipment, the supplier may resubmit its application and a sample for retesting by JATE.
Certification Plan, supra note 183, at 782. For a comparison of NTT's former type approval fees to
JATE's approval fees, see TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS, supra note 20, at 10, 12 and Equip-
ment Certification, supra note 183, at 6, 21.
186 TBL art. 51(1).
187 Id.
188 Id. art. 94(v).
189 MOSS Talks, supra note 181, at Attachment I (A)(14). For example, in June 1985, the Minis-
try selected two Japanese nationals employed by United States companies to serve on the Advisory
Council. D. ABELSON, supra note 182, at 11.
190 EMBASSY REPORT, supra note 155, at 11. The NTT Act and the TBL left KDD's interna-
tional telecommunications services unchanged. During the summer of 1986, however, the Ministry
ended KDD's monopoly over international VAN services in Japan in response to growing demands
from Japanese financial institutions and trading companies. International VAN Service to Be Decon-
trolled, Japan Econ. J., Apr. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 4. The Ministry move to deregulate international
VAN services resembled the decontrol of domestic VAN services in October 1982. See supra notes
47-48 and accompanying text.
191 EMBASSY REPORT, supra note 155, at 11. Until October 1986, the Japanese government
owned all of Private NTT's 15.6 million shares. See Gov't Will Offer 200,000 N7T Shares for Auc-
tion, Japan Econ. J., July 5, 1986, at 4, col. 1. Japan's Finance Ministry auctioned off 200,000
Private NTT shares to institutional investors during October 1986 to help determine a competitive
selling price for later issues. See Gov't Takes NTT Bids from Large Investors, Japan Econ. J., Oct.
11, 1986, at 3, col. 3. Based on these bids, the Finance Ministry offered another 1.65 million Private
NTT shares to individual investors during November 1986 at Y 1.197 million per share. See Govern-
ment Sets N7T Stock Price at ¥1,197,000, Japan Econ. J., Nov. 8, 1986, at 2, col. 3. During the
next four years, the Finance Ministry plans to sell 10.4 million Private NTT shares-two-thirds of
the 15.6 million shares outstanding. Id.
The price of Private NTT shares has risen dramatically in trading since it was listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange on February 9, 1987. Investors who purchased Private NTT shares for
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tion, the NTT Act prohibits foreign ownership of Private NTT shares
with one exception: if foreign capital constitutes less than one-half of a
Japanese corporation's capital, the Japanese corporation may invest in
Private NTT shares.192
The NTT Act grants the Ministry regulatory power over Private
NTT. Subject to Ministry approval, Private NTT may pursue business
incidental to domestic telecommunications service, such as weather fore-
casting, time information, sales of CPE, and other business activities nec-
essary to Private NTT's purpose. 193 The Ministry also retains power to
authorize Private NTT's annual business plan, 194 appoint and dismiss di-
rectors and auditors, change the articles of incorporation, and dispose of
profits. 195
As a result of the NTT Act, consumers no longer must purchase a
standard telephone set from NTT.196 Instead, they may purchase CPE
from Private NTT or its competitors. 197 As with the PCL, the NTT Act
prohibits Private NTT from manufacturing its own equipment,198
thereby forcing Private NTT to continue purchasing all equipment under
the terms of the Second Procurement Agreement.199
E. The Effect of the New Telecommunications Laws
The Diet enacted Japan's new telecommunications laws to promote
the public welfare. The public welfare depended on the successful imple-
mentation of four policy objectives: 1) dependable, 2) diverse, and 3)
inexpensive telecommunications services and equipment, and 4) im-
proved foreign trade relations. Continued regulatory supervision by the
Y1.197 million in 1986 were able to sell at If1.6 million on February 10, 1987, the shares' second
day of trading. See NIT Shares Scorch Skyward, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 7, 1987, at 24, col. 2. Be-
tween February 16 and 24, 1987, the price rose from Y1.79 million to Y2.67 million. Id. At these
prices, Private NTr's current market value is twice the size of IBM's current market value. See
NIT Shares Fetch YL 7MiL in Tokyo Stock Exchange Trading, Japan Econ. J., Feb. 21, 1987, at 3,
col. 1.
192 DOING BUSINESS WrrH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 381.
193 id. at 378. The Ministry retained discretion to limit Private NTr's tangential business activi-
ties in order to protect companies in businesses related to communications from Private NTT com-
petition. Id. at 379.
194 Note, Japanese Telecommunications, supra note 10, at 127.
195 EMBASSY REPORT, supra note 155, at 12. Despite continuing Ministry regulation, the NTT
Act gave Private NTr's management discretion over employee compensation. Formerly, an NTT
employee's compensation was fixed at levels equal to other "national public service personnel." See
supra note 37. Under the NTT Act, however, an employee's pay depends on Private NTT's returns
and management discretion. Neff, supra note 54, at 39.
196 Japan's Home Telephone Revolution, Bus. JAPAN, July 1985, at 21.
197 See Neff, supra note 54, at 34.
198 Id. at 39.
199 Doe, supra note 134, at 132; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Ministry assured dependable service and equipment. Competition, on
the other hand, promised to diversify Japanese telecommunications, re-
duce prices, and placate foreign trade relations.
1. Governmental Regulation
The TBL delegates extensive regulatory authority to the Minis-
try.2"0 The Ministry exercises broad regulatory oversight over Private
NTTz01 and Type I carriers,2 °z but exercises less regulatory control over
Special Type II carriers and even less over General Type II carriers.2 0 3
Type II carriers serve smaller markets than Type I carriers and have less
impact on the public welfare; consequently, the Ministry exercises less
regulatory control over them. 04 The Ministry's regulatory power shapes
not only the conditions under which carriers may operate, but also the
standards for and installation of telecommunications equipment.20 5 By
endowing the Ministry with comprehensive regulatory oversight, the
Diet evidenced its continuing interest in ensuring dependable telecommu-
nications service and equipment in order to benefit the public welfare.
The Ministry already has exercised its power to safeguard against an
oversupply of satellite telecommunications services. Although it had li-
censed five new Type I carriers, the Ministry refused to license a sixth
Type I applicant, Satellite Japan, in January 1986. The Ministry had
licensed Japan Communications and Space Communications in June
1985; to license Satellite Japan would have created an oversupply of sat-
ellite services and jeopardized the viability of all three satellite carriers.20 6
The Ministry's decision to reject Satellite Japan's license application,
therefore, evidenced a willingness to exercise regulatory power to guaran-
tee dependable telecommunications service. 07
200 Foster, supra note 9, at 9.
201 See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 178.
205 See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
206 Sony-led Satellite Japan Fails to Get License from MPT, Japan Econ. J., Feb. 1, 1986, at 17,
col. 3 [hereinafter Satellite Japan]. The TBL directs the Ministry to reject license applications sub-
mitted by potential Type I carriers when the Type I carrier's services will create an excess of tele-
communications circuit facilities. TBL art. 10(ii).
When Satellite Japan submitted its application, the Ministry estimated that the demand for
satellite service would require 29.8 transponders in 1988, 52.7 in 1990, 76.1 in 1995, and 87.5 in
2000. Satellite Japan, supra at 17. By adding Satellite Japan's 72 transponder capacity, the three
companies' combined capacity would have totalled 206 transponders. Id. Consequently, the three
companies' combined capacity would have exceeded demand in 1988 by 176 transponders.
207 Cf JNR Affiliate to Set Up Paging Service with Japan, U.S. Firms, Japan Econ. J., Oct. 11,
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2. Competition in the Private Market
Despite the Ministry's regulatory control, the phrase "regulated
competitive market" best describes the character of Japan's restructured
telecommunications market. As evidence of the developing competitive-
ness of this restructured market, the Ministry had approved and licensed
five new Type I carriers by November 1985.208 Each of these carriers
plans to begin service using their own circuits in the autumn of 1987.209
Initially, each will concentrate on telecommunications between Tokyo
and Osaka, the industrial corridor which traditionally generated 40% of
NTT's revenues.21 0 Japan Teleway will lay optical fiber cable along Ja-
pan's freeways,211 whereas Japan Telecom will lay optical fiber cable
along bullet train lines.212 Second NTT, another new Type I competitor,
will construct a microwave transmission network and hopes to undercut
Private NTT's long-distance rates by 20% to 30%.213 Finally, the two
other new Type I carriers-Japan Communications and Space Commu-
nications-will establish satellite networks.214
In addition to the five new Type I carriers, new Type II carriers
have entered Japan's telecommunications market. Between April and
November 1985, 170 companies notified the Ministry of their intent to
establish General Type II carriers.215 By November 1985, eight compa-
nies had applied to the Ministry for Special Type II status.216 The entry
of these 178 new Type II carriers, plus the five new Type I carriers,
should create much competition among carriers.
Since the new telecommunications laws became effective, many
United States companies have introduced foreign competition to Japan's
1986, at 12, col. 1 (the Ministry encourages four paging service companies to merge to avoid
oversupply).
208 Shinto Shake-up, supra note 56, at 18.
209 Id. Consequently, Private NTT will face limited competition from Type I carriers until au-
tumn 1987 because potential competitors' networks will not be built. A Trade War in the Air, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 1985, at 60 [hereinafter Trade War]. Three of the companies-Japan Teleway,
Japan Telecom, and Second NTT-started service between Tokyo and Osaka in autumn 1986 using
circuits leased from Private NTT. See Daini-Denden Begins Leasing Circuits, Japan Econ. J., Nov.
1, 1986, at 20, col. 1.
210 Shinto Shake-up, supra note 56, at 18.
211 Trade War, supra note 209, at 60.
212 Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7, at 80.
213 Burgess, supra note 30, at 21, col. 4.
214 Shinto Shake-up, supra note 56, at 18.
215 Id. In February 1985, before the TBL became effective, only 81 companies operated 100 VAN
systems. DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 384. Type II carriers primarily offer VAN
services. See Komiya & Renaud, supra note 32, at 164. The entry of the 170 new General Type II
carriers, therefore, substantially increased the availability of VAN services in Japan.
216 Shinto Shake-up, supra note 56, at 18.
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market by doing business with Private NTT's competitors. For example,
Digital Switch Corporation received a $10-$20 million order for tandem
switches from Second NTT.217 In January 1986, AT&T reached an
agreement with Tokyo-based Ricoh Company and Toshiba Corporation
for marketing AT&T data switching systems.218 Japan Communica-
tions, one of the new Type I carriers, will use a satellite manufactured by
Hughes Aerospace Company.219 In addition to these examples of equip-
ment sales, six United States companies have entered VAN joint ventures
with Japanese companies.2 2 °
Private NTT, along with its competitors, has purchased equipment
made in the United States and entered into a VAN joint venture with an
IBM subsidiary. In January 1986, Private NTT contracted to purchase
central switching systems from Northern Telecom.22 1 The contract, ex-
pected to amount to Y40 billion over a five-year period, represented the
first sale to NTT or Private NTT of central switching equipment made in
the United States.2 22 The sale by Northern Telecom constituted part of
Private NTT's total foreign procurement during 1985, 90% of which
came from United States companies.2 23 Besides purchasing equipment
imported from the United States, Private NTT began operating a VAN
joint venture with IBM Japan, Ltd., in January 1986.224 The joint ven-
ture, Nippon Information and Communication Corporation, uses IBM
hardware in its network and provides on-line data processing of deposits,
loans, and foreign exchange for Saitama Bank and Kyowa Bank.2 2 5 The
joint venture represents Private NTT's first venture at developing
software for IBM hardware and offering on-line services for banks.
226
a. Diversifying telecommunications equipment and services
Competition in Japan's telecommunications market has prompted
217 Robertson, IBM, N7Tin Japan Value-Added Net Venture, Electronic News, Sept. 30, 1985, at
8, col. 5.
218 Increased Competition Looms for Japan's PBX Market, Japan Econ. J., Apr. 12, 1986, at 14,
cols. 1-3.
219 See Shinto Shake-up, supra note 56, at 20.
220 Robertson, supra note 217, at 8, cols. 1-2.
221 NTT to Buy Northern Telecom Switching Gear, Japan Econ. J., Jan. 4 & 11, 1986, at 16, col. 3.
222 Id. Previously, NTT and Private NTT purchased central switching systems from four
Denden family suppliers: NEC Corporation, Fujitsu, Hitachi, and Oki Electric. Id.
223 Mark Time, supra note 12, at 19, col. 4.
224 IBM on a Great Sales Offensive in Japan; Competitors Here Gird for Counterattack; IBM-N7T
Ties Upsetting, JAPAN ECON. REV., Nov. 15, 1985, at 11, cols. 1-2.





numerous companies to introduce a variety of new equipment.227 For
example, Omron Tateishi Electronics Company now markets phone call
processing equipment made in the United States by OPCOM.228 Ricoh
has introduced the Rifax Alpha-10, a high-speed facsimile machine.22 9
Marubeni Corporation now sells digital wireless telephones made in the
United States.23 Finally, Fujitsu has developed several on-line banking
machines, such as automatic tellers and deposit machines.
231
In addition to the new equipment, an influx of new services has en-
tered Japan's market. In September 1986, Nihon Keizan Shimbun, Inc.,
introduced Nikkei Telecom Japan News and Retrieval, an English lan-
guage, on-line information service providing data and news concerning
East Asian business.232 Japan Telecom now offers a paging service,2 33
and Recruit Company leases access to its database which contains infor-
mation about jobs, travel, and used cars.234 The inflow of new equipment
and services, as evidenced by these examples, indicates that the new laws
have helped to achieve the Diet's objective of diversifying Japanese
telecommunications.
Private NTT also has diversifed its business beyond primary tele-
phone service in order to remain competitive. For example, it has devel-
oped an on-line banking system that simplifies operation of foreign
exchange terminals.235 It is building a nationwide public facsimile ser-
vice with sales outlets in neighborhood florist shops and liquor stores.236
Private NTT also plans to provide answering services for business and
electronic mail services.2 37 In addition, NTT System Technology Com-
pany, a wholly-owned subsidiary, designs data communication systems
and software.238 Pursuant to the more lenient investment restrictions
227 Recent Change and Future Prospect in Telecommunications Market, 1986 DIG. OF JAPANESE
INDUS. & TECH. 16 [hereinafter Recent Change].
228 Omron to Market US. Phone-Call Processor, Japan Econ. J., Dec. 20, 1986, at 11, col. 2.
229 Ricoh to Sell Facsimile Produced by Toshiba, Japan Econ. J., Sept. 27, 1986, at 19, col. 5.
230 Marubeni Starts Marketing Digital Wireless Phone, Japan Econ. J., Sept. 27, 1986, at 19, col.
5.
231 Mitsubishi Bank Gives Computer Order to Fujitsu, Japan Econ. J., Feb. 7, 1987, at 14, col. 1.
232 Nikkei Offers English Database on 3,200 Corporation in Asia, Japan Econ. J., Jan. 17, 1987, at
1, col. 1; Electronic Financial News Service to Be Launched Worldwide in English, Japan Econ. J.,
Sept. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
233 JNR Affiliate to Set Up Paging Service with Japan, U.S. Firms, Japan Econ. J., Oct. 11, 1986,
at 12, col. 1.
234 Recruit to Lease US. Firms Time on Supercomputers, Japan Econ. J., Oct. 11, 1986, at 13, col.
1.
235 NIT Develops Terminals for Foreign Exchange, Japan Econ. J., Sept. 27, 1986, at 19, col. 4.
236 Doe, supra note 134, at 135.
237 Id.; see also N7T Plans Computer-Mail Service, Japan Econ. J., Dec. 20, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
238 Davis, N77'Diversifying into Many Fields with Establishment of Subsidiaries, Japan Econ. J.,
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prescribed in the NTT Act,2 39 Private NTT has branched out into these
other business ventures24" and enhanced its competitiveness while, at the
same time, it has promoted the Diet's goal for more diversified telecom-
munications products and services.
b. Reducing prices
Besides introducing a variety of telecommunications equipment and
services, the competing companies have reduced equipment prices and
lowered service rates. Equipment prices already have declined24 and
should continue to decrease. Under the NTT Act, consumers no longer
must purchase a standard telephone set from NTT.24 2 Instead, consum-
ers will purchase CPE from the interconnect market. As a result, the
interconnect market will expand, lowering CPE prices while encouraging
telephone manufacturers to produce more modem, sophisticated
telephones. 24 '
Rates for telecommunications services also have declined and
should continue to decrease. Japan Teleway, Japan Telecom, and Second
NTT already offer rates 20% lower than NTT's rates.2 1 With compet-
ing carriers developing more services, the volume of Japan's entire tele-
Mar. 15, 1986, at 19, col. 3. NTT System Technology Company is designing the Bank of Japan's
new on-line computer system using IBM hardware. Doe, supra note 134, at 135.
239 DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, supra note 2, at 380.
240 Private NTT created 33 subsidiaries and affiliates by January 1986. NIT Sets Up 33 Subsidi-
aries, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 17, col. 3. It plans eventually to establish a large group of 500
to 700 subsidiaries and affiliates. Id. In addition to its new subsidiaries related to telecommunica-
tions, Private NTT branched out into new business fields. Private NTT has a 35% stake in INS
Engineering Corporation, a company which sells computer-aided design software. Davis, supra note
238, at 19, col. 3. NTT Ad Company, of which Private NTT owns 75%, specializes in advertising.
Id. at 19, col. 2. Private NTT also plans to create a wholly owned subsidiary called NTT Urban
Development Company to develop Private NTT's land holdings in major cities. N7T Will Start
Urban Development Business, Japan Econ. J., Jan. 18, 1986, at 18, col. 3.
241 Recent Change, supra note 227, at 17. For example, NTT recently introduced a facsimile, the
NTTFAX-20 model, priced at Y 128,000, undercutting the least expensive facsimile on the market
by Y20,000. NT to Introduce Lowest-Priced Facsimile, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 14, 1987, at 17, col. 5.
242 JETRO, supra note 5, at 3. As an equal among the competitors in the telecommunications
equipment market, Private NTT, which still may not manufacture its own telecommunications
equipment, will concentrate its procurement on the domestic or foreign vendors who offer the most
competitive prices. See Williamson, Communications Tokyo: One Year into the New Era, TELEPH-
ONY, Feb. 24, 1986, at 57.
243 Japanese Telecoms, supra note 7, at 80. In April 1985, only 17% of Japan's 63 million in-
stalled telephones had been purchased from the interconnect market. See Neff, supra note 54, at 34.
That percentage will grow under the new telecommunications laws.
244 Three New Common Carriers Unveil Service Rate Structures, Japan Econ. J., July 12, 1986, at
12, cols. 4-5 [hereinafter Unveil Rates]. To remain competitive, Private NTT is contemplating a
10% rate cut for high-volume leased circuits. See NTT Likely to Cut Charges on Long-Distance
Circuits, Japan Econ. J., Mar. 14, 1987, at 17, cols. 1-2.
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communications market will increase.245 As a result, carriers should be
able to charge less, yet reap the same amount of profit. In addition, com-
petition should create more incentives for increased efficiency.246 Fi-
nally, NTT's competitors currently operate by using telecommunications
circuits leased from NTT.247 By late 1987, they should reduce rates even
further by operating their own circuits.248 With competition lowering
the cost of equipment and services, the new laws have encouraged an-
other of the Diet's policy goals.
c. Improving trade relations
In addition to diversifying and lowering prices for telecommunica-
tions, the new laws may help ameliorate trade relations between Japan
and the United States. During 1985, the first year that Japan's market
operated under the new laws, the telecommunications trade imbalance
between Japan and the United States dropped to Y276.4 billion, down
from Y295 billion in 1984, a 6.3% decrease.24 9 This represented the first
decrease in five years.250 During the first six months of 1986, Japan's
trade surplus with the United States in telecommunications equipment
continued to abate.251 The new telecommunications laws, therefore, may
have helped bring about another of the Diet's objectives: to increase for-
eign access to Japan's telecommunications market so as to reduce Japan's
telecommunications trade surplus and ameliorate foreign trade
relations.252
Although the telecommunications trade imbalance decreased during
1985 and the first six months of 1986, nothing indicates that the new laws
caused the decrease.25 3 Numerous other factors, untouched by the TBL,
affect the balance of trade. For example, Japanese governmental prac-
tices and regulations, such as administrative guidance and restrictions on
imports, affect the balance of trade by hindering foreign access to Japa-
245 Sawada, supra note 9, at 87.
246 Id.
247 Unveil Rates, supra note 244, at 12, col. 4.
248 See Takeuchi, The Changing World of Japan's Telecommunications, TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
June 1986, at 112.
249 Davis, supra note 13, at 10, col. 3.
250 Id.
251 See Recent Change, supra note 227, at 21. In 1985, Japan imported one unit of telecommuni-
cations equipment from the United States for every 10.3 units it exported to the United States. In
the first six months of 1986, however, the ratio was only one to eight. Id.
252 See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
253 Even Japanese analysts have attributed the 1985-1986 decrease not to the new laws, but to
market conditions in the United States and the appreciated value of the yen. See Recent Change,
supra note 227, at 17, 19.
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nese markets.254 The value of the dollar also affects the balance of
trade25 5 because a strong dollar makes goods from the United States
more expensive than products manufactured outside the United
States. 56  In addition, Japanese cultural attitudes25 7 and practices258
contribute to the trade balance as do certain ethnocentric business prac-
tices by United States companies in Japan.259 Another problem is the
two countries' respective production-consumption ratios: Japan produces
more than it consumes260 whereas the United States consumes more than
it produces. 61 These and other factors presumably contributed to the
254 Abbott & Totman, "Black Ships" and Balance Sheets: The Japanese Market and U.S.-Japan
Relations, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 103, 129 (1981)(administrative guidance); Heimlich, High-Tech
Trade Competition: Economic, Political Dimensions, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., July 1986, at 22 (import,
distribution, and foreign investment restrictions protect domestic firms).
255 Pressman, Telecommunications: Looking to Hill for Help, 44 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 194
(1986); Collision Course, supra note 15, at 52. The United States federal budget deficit contributes to
the high value of the dollar. Mino, Yen-Dollar Rate Alone Won't Resolve Trade Friction, Bus. JA-
PAN, Jan. 1986, at 24. Needless to say, the TBL has no power to reduce the federal budget deficit.
Accord Recent Development, International Trade" Reforming Japanese Trade Policy, 27 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 295, 302-03 (1986). Some United States trade officials estimate that the high value of the
dollar accounted for more than two-thirds of the $37 billion trade deficit in 1984. See Collision
Course, supra note 15, at 52.
256 See Pressman, supra note 255, at 194; see also Chira, Can U.S. Goods Succeed in Japan?, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1985, at C29, col. 2.
257 For example, the Japanese historically have considered foreign goods suitable only for foreign-
ers, not as an alternative to Japanese products. Wolfwitz, Protectionism and US.-Japan Trade,
DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1985, at 51. See also, Chira, supra note 256, at Cl, col. 3 (Japanese attitude
that United States goods poorer quality than Japanese goods).
258 Cultural practices, such as reliance on traditional domestic supplier relationships and an in-
formal "buy Japan" preference, hinder access to Japanese markets. See Abbott & Totman, supra
note 254, at 129-34. For a cultural and historical explanation of Japanese barriers to foreign goods
and culture, see id. at 129-44; S. COHEN, UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 48-52 (1985); Kristof, Japan Trade
Barriers Called Mainly Cultural, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
259 For example, trade and business officials from the United States often speak no Japanese.
Collision Course, supra note 15, at 52. They also lobby ineffectively for United States interests in
Japan. Id. Instructions for United States products sometimes are not written in Japanese.
Wolfowitz, supra note 257, at 51. According to the Electronic Industries Association of Japan,
Japanese manufacturers accommodate buyers whereas United States manufacturers fail to do so:
Japanese manufacturers are eager to accommodate buyers' needs based on mutual trust, while
U.S. manufacturers are interested in their own need to close big sales and to deliver products
according to the plans sanctioned by their contracts.
Japanese manufacturers provide extensive language training to personnel, prepare materi-
als in the native language, and adjust their products according to specifications in the foreign
market, while U.S. manufacturers present catalogues, specifications and contracts in English,
and adhere to the U.S. approach.
EIA Japan Says US. Marketing Strategies Are to Blame for Trade Failures, Electronic News, July
15, 1985, at 56, cols. 3-4.
260 Wolfowitz, supra note 257, at 51. One reason for Japan's excess production over domestic
consumption is that the Japanese have a high rate of savings. In Japan, net savings is 16%; net
savings is only 2% in the United States. Id. Japanese gross private saving equals more than 30% of
Japan's GNP. The average of other OECD countries is about 50% lower than that figure. Id.
261 Niskanen, How We Can Cut the Trade Deficit, Chicago Trib., Dec. 9, 1986, § 1, at 23, col. 3.
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1985-1986 decrease. Consequently, the new laws deserve only partial
credit for the improved telecommunications trade imbalance.
Even if the 1985-1986 decrease is attributed solely to the new laws, a
positive prognosis for trade relations based on their potential effect is
premature for at least five reasons. First, Private NTT's Type I competi-
tors have been in business too short a time to predict how much equip-
ment they will purchase from United States suppliers. None of them
even plan to offer full-scale services until autumn 1987.262 Second, com-
petition may not force Private NTT to purchase more telecommunica-
tions equipment from foreign suppliers.263 Third, the demand for
telecommunications equipment may be greatest for low-technology CPE
which United States suppliers sell least competitively. 26 Fourth, noth-
ing indicates that joint ventures between Japanese and United States
companies will encourage sales in Japan of United States telecommunica-
tions equipment. Fifth, the United States may expect faster decreases in
the telecommunications trade imbalance than are possible.
The 1985-1986 decrease and the potential benefits of Japan's new
laws did help mollify United States concern over the telecommunications
trade imbalance. That result met Japan's immediate policy objective of
avoiding United States trade sanctions. Unless Japan's trade surplus
with the United States continues to decrease in this area, however, the
new laws will do little to thwart United States trade sanctions or to en-
courage amenable long-term trade relations. United States trade officials
The demand for telecommunications equipment in the United States will continue to outpace domes-
tic production. Between 1985 and 1987, the United States telecommunications equipment market
will grow from $21.2 billion to $27.3 billion, a 29% increase. Socolovsky, Communication Equip-
ment Acquires a Foreign Accent, ELECTRONIC Bus., Apr. 15, 1986, at 17. These figures, however,
equal more than twice the projected growth in domestic production between 1985 and 1987. Id.
Imported telecommunications equipment will fill the gap. Id.
262 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
263 Between 1984 and 1985, the time period during which the new laws took effect, Private NTT's
foreign procurement did increase by 5%. Mark Time, supra note 12, at 19, col. 4. The 5% increase,
however, probably had little or no impact on the two countries' trade imbalance in telecommunica-
tions equipment for two reasons. The 5% increase improved the percentage of Private NTT pro-
curement devoted to foreign companies only if domestic procurement during 1985 decreased or
increased less than 5%; this figure alone fails to disclose whether either happened. In addition, with
90% of Private NTT procurement already going to United States suppliers, an annual 5% increase
in Private NTT procurement would result in insignificant gains for United States suppliers. But cf
supra note 12.
264 See J. HILLS, supra note 1, at 114. Only Type I carriers purchase high technology equipment,
such as central switching and transmission equipment, which they use to construct their networks.
In contrast, Japan's entire consumer population purchases low technology equipment, such as fac-
similes, telephones, and modems, because a consumer must install low technology equipment to use
telecommunications services. The demand for low technology products, therefore, should always be
greater than the demand for high technology products.
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and Congress look to telecommunications trade as a crucial indicator of
Japan's commitment to remedy the overall trade imbalance.2z 5 Conse-
quently, they probably will expect even greater reductions in the telecom-
munications trade imbalance before dismissing trade sanctions as an
alternative.
Meanwhile, Japan and the United States should expect no marked
improvement in the telecommunications trade imbalance until several
factors affecting the balance of trade are present. Two are already in
place. First, Japan has converted its monopolistic telecommunications
system into a private market by enacting the TBL and the NTT Act.
Second, the dollar has declined in value since September 1985.266 Other
long-range factors, however, must fall into place before the two countries
can expect any significant improvement. Hopefully, as United States
manufacturers continue to supply the Japanese telecommunications mar-
ket, 67 Japanese consumers will become accustomed to buying equipment
made in the United States. z68 In addition, United States companies must
265 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
266 The dollar traded at a rate of Y240 in September 1985, but dropped to Y180 during the first
quarter of 1986. Willson, Assessing the Impact of a Stronger Yen, ELECTRONIC Bus., June 1, 1986,
at 40; cf. Consumers Begin Benefitting from Lower Cost of Imports, Japan Econ. J., Aug. 9, 1986, at
4, col. 2 (yen appreciates 29.1% against dollar between September 1985 and June 1986). The dollar
continued its descent in 1987, falling below the Y 150 mark on January 19, 1987. Economy & Busi-
ness, Japan Econ. J., Jan. 31, 1987, at 2, col. 4. As of March 30, 1987, it had reached its lowest level
since the late 1940s, trading at Y 145.80. Yates, U.S. Sanctions Show Decline, Japanese Say, Chicago
Trib., Mar. 30, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
267 At least four business options are available to United States companies for penetrating Japan's
telecommunications market. First, United States suppliers can continue to sell telecommunications
equipment to Private NTT and its competitors. Several United States companies, such as Digital
Switch Corporation, AT&T, Hughes Aerospace, and Northern Telecom, already have met with suc-
cess in Japan's telecommunications equipment market. See supra notes 217-19, 221 and accompany-
ing text. To meet the current demands of the Japanese market, United States companies may need
to produce more competitive CPE rather than large-scale telecommunications switching systems.
See supra note 265. Second, Japanese and United States telecommunications companies can pursue
more joint ventures. Hayashi, Haruo Yamaguchi: NTT's Procurement Man, ELECTRONIC BUS.,
Feb. 1, 1986, at 46. But see Heimlich, supra note 254, at 23 (joint ventures could worsen the trade
imbalance). For recommendations on establishing successful joint ventures with Japanese compa-
nies, see, e.g., McArthur, Joint Ventures in Japan, 20 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 71 (1986); Beem &
Impert, Establishing a Joint Venture, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Jan. 1986, at 17; Tung, Keys to Success
in Joint Ventures in Japan, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov. 1984, at 9. Third, United States companies
can enter Japan's telecommunications services market as Type II carriers. Fourth, United States
investors can invest in Japanese and United States telecommunications companies operating in Ja-
pan's market. See Special Report: The Report of the Advisory Group on Economic Structural Adjust-
ment for International Harmony, Bus. JAPAN, May 1986, at 26; Wolfowitz, supra note 257, at 51.
By pursuing business options such as these, United States companies will establish a presence in
Japan's telecommunications market which should produce long-term gains for the United States
companies and long-term improvement in the balance of trade in telecommunications between Japan
and the United States.
268 In the United States during the 1960s, Japanese goods carried the stigma of being poorly
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learn to accommodate Japanese business practices.269 As Japan becomes
more dependent on telecommunications, its market should expand. If its
domestic market grows faster than domestic production, Japan will begin
to absorb the products formerly exported. 7° United States companies,
on the other hand, must produce more telecommunications products in
order to curb the need for exports created by an undersupply of domestic
products. As these factors affect the balance of trade, it was naive to
expect any significant short-term improvement in the telecommunica-
tions trade imbalance based solely on the effects of the new laws. In-
stead, the new laws represented only one step of the several needed to
realize a long-term solution to the trade imbalance in
telecommunications.
III. CONCLUSION
Japan's telecommunications laws are now limited to structuring a
competitive telecommunications market. Between 1952 and April 1985,
NTT held a monopoly over domestic telecommunications services and,
until 1981, bought telecommunications equipment exclusively from Japa-
nese suppliers. During those years, NTT accomplished Japan's primary
telecommunications policy objectives: it completed a nationwide tele-
communications system and cultivated the domestic industry.
In 1981, Japan opened NTT procurement contracts and the inter-
connect market to foreign telecommunications equipment suppliers pur-
suant to the Procurement and Interconnect Agreements. In practice,
however, the agreements only gave foreign companies competitive access
to Japan's interconnect market because NTT continued to award pro-
curement contracts primarily to domestic suppliers. Consequently, the
made. Chira, supra note 256, at C29, col. 1. Today, United States consumers rarely question the
quality of products with a Japanese brand name. Likewise, Japanese consumers will eventually be-
come familiar with telecommunications equipment made in the United States and buy it without
questioning its brand name. Cf. Williamson, Communications Tokyo: One Year into the New Era,
TELEPHONY, Feb. 24, 1986, at 57 (Japanese consumers still unfamiliar with foreign brands and
products).
269 One positive step would be for United States companies to enroll key personnel in Japanese
language classes offered by JETRO. JETRO offers 25-week courses in which students receive 90
hours of language training plus 10 hours of lecture in English about Japanese business practices.
Frankel, Organizations Fight Trade Barriers with New Japanese-Language Classes, Japan Econ. J.,
Oct. 18, 1986, at 28, col. 1. For a discussion of Japanese business etiquette and practices, see gener-
ally Otsubo, A Guide to Japanese Business Practices, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1986, at 28.
270 See Niskanen, supra note 261, § 1, at 23, col. 4; see also U.S. Rips Japan Budget Policy, Chi-
cago Trib., Mar. 10, 1987, § 3, at 8, col. 1 (increased domestic demand in Japan lessens Japanese
trade surplus); but see lida, supra note 14, at 253, 255 (expanded domestic demand in Japan insignifi-
cantly improves trade imbalance).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:145(1987)
Procurement Agreement failed to mitigate Japan's growing trade surplus
in telecommunications equipment.
Japan's new telecommunications laws, which became effective in
April 1985, ended NTT's monopoly and established a regulated competi-
tive market. Under the new laws, the Ministry regulates Japan's tele-
communications market to assure dependable telecommunications
services and equipment. The new laws have encouraged many private
carriers to enter the market to compete with Private NTT. As a result,
Private NTT and its competitors have introduced a greater variety of
services and equipment to satisfy sophisticated consumer demands. The
competition also has lowered prices for services and equipment. Since
the new laws became effective, however, Japan's telecommunications
trade surplus with the United States has not decreased enough to satisfy
the United States. The new laws, therefore, promote several of Japan's
current policy objectives, but represent only part of the remedy to the
telecommunications trade imbalance between the two countries.
Douglas W. Colber
